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REAL PROPERTY LAW
RALPH E. BOYER*
PRE-VMw
Judicial rather than legislative activity accounted for the principal
developments in the real property field during the past two years.' Amidst
the constantly flowing stream of judicial pronouncements and biennial out-
spurts of the legislature, the following phenomena occurred: the courts
moved toward the proposition of applying against the state the principle
of legal estoppel to the same extent as such estoppel is applied against an
individual; 2 a mortgage executed to secure future advances was accorded
priority over a homestead status attaching subsequent to the execution of
the mortgage, but prior to the payment of the advances;3 a particular club
membership device to accomplish discrimination in the use and occupancy
of real estate was invalidated; 4 the Mechanics' Lien Law was amended to
overcome decisions5 and accord a lien to a sub-subcontractor;6 and a foreign
antenuptial contract was held ineffective to bar a claim of dower to Florida
real estate subsequently acquired when the contract did not comply with
the Florida law relating to real property.7
Because of the large number of decisions and breadth of the subject
matter, the material herein presented represents the writer's selection of
*Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. This survey covers material in volumes 112 through 131 of the Southern Reporter,
second series, applicable federal decisions during the period, and legislation enacted in 1961.
2. Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v. Lobean, 127 So.2d 98 (Fla.
1961), approving, Lobean v. Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund, 118 So.2d 226(Fla. App. 1960). See text accompanying note 51 infra.
3. Simpson v. Simpson, 123 So.2d 289 (Fla. App. 1960). See text accompanying
note 91 infra.
4. Harris v. Sunset Islands Property Owners, Inc., 116 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1959).
See text accompanying note 126 infra.
5. Richard Store Co. v. Florida Bridge & Iron, Inc., 77 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1954);
Cory v. White, 129 So.2d 446 (Fla. App. 1961). See text accompanying note 189 infra.
6. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-326, creating FLA. STAT. § 84.021 (1961).
7. Kyle v. Kyle, 128 So.2d 427 (Fla. App. 1961). See text accompanying note
74 infra.
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what appears to him as the most noteworthy and significant developments.
Reaffirmation of principles well established in Florida, particularly as they
apply to commonly recurring fact situations, are generally excluded.
The style of this article follows that of previous survey articles," with
the subject matter being divided into seven principal headings; to wit:
I. Vendor and Purchaser
II. Deeds - Description, Parties, Recording,
Cancellation
III. Estates, Dower, Homestead and Future Interests
IV. Easements, Covenants, Water Law and Zoning
V. Adverse Possession, Dedication, Tax Titles
and Eminent Domain
VI. Mechanics' Liens and Mortgages
VII. Landlord and Tenant.
No special section is provided to discuss new legislation as that material is
incorporated into the principal divisions listed above. Access to particular
material is provided by the generous use of headings and subheadings.
I. VENDOR AND PURCHASER9
Statute of Frauds, or the Trusting Souls WX1ho Do Not Demand a Writing
Although the Statute of Frauds has been a part of our legal heritage
since 1677,10 it is still the focal point of frequent litigation," particularly
in regard to such matters as the sufficiency of the memorandum and the
proper application of part performance. Recent litigation as to the memo-
randum asserted or reaffirmed the following propositions: if the suit is
against the purchaser, a deed cannot constitute the memorandum since the
deed is not signed by the grantee;12 a deed which does not recite a promise
to pay, or state anything concerning a balance due or the manner of pay-
ment, is insufficient as a memorandum; 13 a telegram and connected instru-
ments may, of course, constitute a memorandum, and the connecting link
8. See 8 MIAMI L.Q. 389 (1954); 10 MIAMI L.Q. 389 (1956); 12 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 499 (1958); and 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 638 (1960).
9. Matters of offer and acceptance, the sufficiency of the terms and conditions,
and similar items applicable to contracts generally, are omitted in deference to the
companion article on contracts. Questions concerning brokers' commissions are also
excluded in favor of the contracts article.
10. 29 Charles II, c. 3.
11. The statute here involved is FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1961), rendering unenforce-
able any contract to convey realty unless the contract, or a memorandum thereof, be in
writing and signed by the party sought to be charged.
12. Williams v. Faile, 118 So.2d 599 (Fla. App. 1960).
13. Ibid.
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between the telegram and the other documents may be a telephone con-
versation; 14 and, that the telegram is not a signed copy is immaterial when
the defendant admitted sending the telegram, since this admission recog-
nizes the authority of the company to affix his signature. 15
Some of the above mentioned propositions were involved in the inter-
esting case of Williams v. Faile,16 an action by the vendor against the
vendee, after delivery of the deed, for the balance of the purchase price.
The contract was oral and there was no sufficient memorandum. The
court stated that when the suit is for the balance of the purchase price,
the action is at law on the oral contract, and part performance is immaterial.
Thus, the vendor could not recover, a result hardly consistent with general
concepts of right and wrong. The dissenting opinion 17 cited contrary
authority for the proposition that the completed conveyance creates a debt
for the purchase price, and that the suit is not on the contract to sell, but
on the debt.
The majority in the above case did not discuss the possibility of
resorting to such other remedial devices or theories of action as the impo-
sition of a constructive trust to prevent unjust enrichment, the creation
of a vendor's or other equitable lien, or the grounding of a suit on an
implied contract. If any theory of recovery was possible, and indeed, it
would seem that one should be if the facts alleged could be proved,' 8 it
would appear that the court should have transferred the case to the equity
side of the court, or allowed an amendment consistent with a possible action
on the legal side, since every complaint is considered to pray for general
relief.' 9
An oral contract for a joint venture to engage in the purchase of real
estate and to share the expenses and profits is not within the Statute of
Frauds and hence need not be in writing.20
Damages
No significant change in the law relating to liquidated damages and
penalties is apparent, the courts recognizing the validity of the former and
denying the validity of the latter, 2' and, at the same time, generally follow-
ing the rule that a vendee in default is not entitled to recover any sums
14. Heffernan v. Keith, 127 So.2d 903 (Fla. App. 1961).
15. Ibid.
16. 118 So.2d 599 (Fla. App. 1960).
17. Id. at 603.
18. One of the defenses was full payment. However, it may be noted that the jury
had returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. It was held error for the trial court not to have
granted a directed verdict for the defendants because of the lack of a writing.
19. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(b).
20. Blynn v. Hirsch, 124 So.2d314 (Fla. App. 1960).
21. See generally Boyer, Survey of Real Property Law, 10 MIAMI L.Q. 389, 390
(1954).
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paid as part of the purchase price.22  This "no recovery" rule was held
inapplicable to a suit by a defaulted vendee against an escrow agent for
return of the deposit after the vendor had sold the land to another; the
defendant escrow agent had failed to interplead the vendor so that no
forfeiture could be asserted, and the contract did not call for any for-
feiture.23  In another case the liquidated damages provision was upheld
when the amount was not so great as to shock the conscience of the court.2 4
The Case of the Disguised Option
A liquidated damage provision was significant in helping the court
reach the conclusion that the purported sales contract secured by the broker
was only an option.25 The case involved the right of a broker to a com-
mission, and the court concluded that the instrument was an attempt to
extend the brokerage agreement. The court stressed the fact that the
liquidated damage provision called for automatic termination upon failure
of the buyer to pay the additional sums, and then added that the instru-
ment was permeated with provisions rendering it an option.
The total sales price of the realty in question was 270,000 dollars, the
commission, 10 per cent or 27,000 dollars, and initially only 2,000 dollars
was paid down. It should also be noted that the owner-vendor had refused
to sign the instrument, and that the enforceability thereof if he had signed
it was not in issue. Undoubtedly, the conclusion that the broker had not
performed by producing a purchaser ready, willing, and able, is justified
under the facts of the case. The emphasis, however, upon the liquidated
damage provision calling for automatic forfeiture as rendering the contract
an option could cause difficulty in other cases. Similar forfeiture provisions
are rather common in contracts of sale.2 6
Equitable Relief, Clean Hands and Similar Dogma
In actions for specific performance and other equitable remedies, usual
equitable principles such as that of due diligence and clean hands27 are
22. Id. at 390.
23. Ossinsky v. Nance, 118 So.2d 47 (Fla. App. 1960).
24. O'Neill v. Broadview, Inc., 112 So.2d 280 (Fla. App. 1959).25. Orange City Hills, Inc. v. Florida Realty Bureau, Inc., 119 So.2d 43 (Fla. App.
1960), cert. dismissed, 125 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1960).
26. See BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 4.07 (1959). In Mannion
v, Owen, 121 So.2d 816 (Fla. App. 1960), where the contract provided for liquidated
damages of only the initial deposit of $4,000, and an acceleration clause gave the vendors
an option to declare the whole sum due and to foreclose the contract, it was held that a
default did not terminate all of the vendee's rights, but that it merely authorized
foreclosure.
In Stoneman v. Peninsula Land Co., 124 So.2d 760 (Fla. App. 1960), after the
vendors notified the vendees that the contract was forfeited because of a substantial
breach, but neither party sought aid of the courts for three years, it was held that the
purchasers were deemed to have abandoned the contract and the vendors could treat
it as forfeited.
27. "A court of equity should not decree specific performance unless the contract
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applicable. Thus, one party is not allowed to speculate on the other's
title,2 and each must act promptly or he may be barred by laches, 29 and
when two parties conspire to mislead or defraud a third party, the court of
equity will not interfere to aid either one.3 0  A suit by the vendors against
the purchasers for specific performance and ancillary relief is in personam
and transitory, hence the proper venue is not the county where the land
lies, but the county where the parties reside when they both reside in the
same county.A'
II. DEEDS - DELIVERY, DESCRIPTION, RECORDING
Delivery, or the Case of the Do-It-Yourself Escrow
The problem of conditional delivery to a party to the transaction was
involved in the case of Paradise Beach Homes, Inc. v. South Atl. Lumber
Co.,32 concerning a note and mortgage. The majority of the court held
that the note and mortgage were delivered on the condition that they were
not to become effective until they were adjusted so that the amount of the
note would reflect the true indebtedness, and that parol evidence could be
admitted to prove a condition precedent for the purpose of showing that
there was no binding contract. A concurring opinion3 3 concluded that
there was an unconditional delivery plus a contemporaneous oral agreement
and it would have permitted parol evidence to show the contemporaneous
oral agreement. The result is justified whatever one may conclude as to
the reasoning used; perhaps it would be preferable to overrule the old rule
that the escrow agent must be a third party and that a conditional delivery
cannot be made to the grantee.34
sought to be enforced is strictly equitable and free from trickery and deception on the
part of the party seeking such performance." Home v. Sewell, 118 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla.
App. 1960).
28. Shirley v. Lake Butler Corp., 123 So.2d 267 (Fla. App. 1960). The novated
contract provided that the vendors would furnish an abstract of title and that the closing
would follow within sixty days. The vendors did not furnish the abstract, but notified
the vendees that they were terminating the contract. More than a year later, the assignee
of the vendees brought an action for specific performance. Land values had risen and
the vendors had sold some of the land to others. The assignee was denied specific
performance since he was barred by laches, but the case was remanded to determine if
the plaintiff was entitled to a return of the $40,000 deposit and rescission.
29. Shirley v. Lake Butler Corp., supra note 28.
30. Faber v. Landman, 123 So.2d 405 (Fla. App. 1960). In this case a landowner
had agreed to sell to the defendant if the land should be used for an inter-faith center.
The defendant then agreed to sell the land to the plaintiff for other purposes, but later
the defendant grieved over his conduct and sought to rescind this contract. In a com-
promise, the defendant conveyed one of the two lots to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
sought specific performance. In denying specific performance, the court said that it
would aid neither party to a contract to defraud a third person.
31. McMullen v. McMullen, 122 So.2d 626 (Fla. App. 1960), noted in 15
U. MIAMI L. REv. 332 (1961).
32. 118 So.2d 825 (Fla. App. 1960).
33. Id. at 832; Wiggington, C. J., concurring specially.
34. This rule is discussed in BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 9.04[5]
[d], at 154. (1959).
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Who Loses When the Escrow Embezzles?
The case of Cradock v. Cooper 5 supports the general rule that defal-
cations of the escrow agent fall on the party who is entitled to the embezzled
money or property. In this case a sum of money was deposited with a third
person for the purpose of satisfying a claim against the sellers or to be
given to them if the claim were satisfied. The claim was settled, but the
depositary had in the meantime embezzled the deposit. It was held that
since the money was in no event to go to the buyers, but rather to go to
the sellers or be used on their behalf, the depositary was an agent of the
sellers and the loss should fall on them.
Consideration, or the Cases of Renigging Grantees
Although consideration is not needed for the effectiveness of a deed, 3
a gift of real estate being permitted,37 failure of consideration when consid-
eration is expected constitutes grounds for cancellation of the deed at the
request of the grantor. Thus, a grantee's promise to build a medical clinic
in exchange for a conveyance was construed as a dependent covenant going
to the entire consideration of the contract for the conveyance in Mease v.
Warm Mineral Springs, Inc.,38 and the deed was accordingly cancelled on
failure to construct the clinic. Similarly, a deed given in consideration of
support may be cancelled when the support is not forthcoming.3 9
Land Description and Boundaries
The platting law was amended to provide that if dedication of a plat
is to be made by a corporation, it may be signed by the president or a
vice-president and the secretary or an assistant secretary with the authority
of the board of directors. 40
When the sale of land is of a specific quantity, usually denominated as
a sale by the acre, the total consideration depends upon the size of the
tract, and adjustments for deficiencies and surpluses may be obtained, but
when the sale is of a specific tract, usually denominated a sale in gross,
no adjustments because of deficiency or surplus in the size of the tract
are permitted, and the fact that the deed also contains a recital that the
tract contains a designated number of acres "more or less" is immaterial.41
35. 123 So.2d 256 (Fla. App. 1960).
36. The role of consideration is discussed in BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANS-
ACTIONS § 11.01, at 179 (1959).
37. Gift cases are discussed in BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §
9.04[3], at 142 (1959), and cases cited therein. See also note 39 infra.
38. 128 So.2d 174 (Fla. App. 1961).
39. Hunter v. Moore, 131 So.2d 489 (Fla. App. 1961), indicating that the con-
veyance would be set aside if made in reliance on a fraudulent promise of support, but
would not be set aside if the grantor-donor simply changed her mind. The deed was
cancelled.
40. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-193, amending FLA. STAT. § 177.06 (1959).
41. Coble v. Agnew, 128 So.2d 158 (Fla. App. 1961), concluding that it was a sale
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Although title to the tract conveyed generally carries to the center of a
monument having width, in the case of a. dedicated strip for street purposes
bordering an ocean, title to the abutting owner carries to the ordinary high
water mark and not just to the center.42 This is obviously a sound rule and
consistent with the policy of dividing dedicated streets after abandonment
between opposite abutting owners so that no owner is left with a long
narrow strip of land not conducive to sensible improvement or utilization.
Accretion, Reliction, Avulsion and Erosion, Including Cases of
Migrating Lands
The doctrine that slow and imperceptible changes wrought by the
action of water results in boundary changes, and that sudden and percep-
tible changes wrought by this action does not result in boundary changes,
is generally followed in Florida. These principles were applied in recent
litigations involving such interesting phenomena as migrating lands. In
Siesta Properties, Inc. v. Hart,43 the court concluded that the changes
were sudden and perceptible as a result of a hurricane, that most of the
deposits on defendant's land came from plaintiff's land, but then added
that the doctrine of avulsion does not authorize a landowner to enlarge his
property lines to an extent necessary to take in new lands thus formed
outside his original boundaries, or to claim title to these lands in their new
location. In other words, a landowner cannot extend his boundaries to
encompass areas not within the confines of his original boundaries in order
to maintain title to his peripatetic soils.
The plaintiff's claim of migrating'- lands was rejected in Forman v.
Florida Land Holding Corp.,44 which held that riparian rights may be
appurtenant to swamp or overflowed lands. The court concluded that the
plaintiff's land was completely lost by erosion and that the defendant's
was enlarged by accretion as a result of hurricanes, storms and tidal action
over the years. A limitation on the rule of accretion was announced in the
Siesta Properties case,45 to the effect that for a landowner to claim title to
accretions, the accretions must begin upon the land of the riparian owner
and not elsewhere from which it may ultimately reach the claimant's parcel.
Disputed Boundaries
Occasions were presented during the biennium to reaffirm the propo-
sition that in case of conflict between surveys, the original controls, and
in gross and denying any abatement of the purchase price. These general principles were
also discussed in Bridges v. Thomas, 118 So.2d 549 (Fla. App. 1960), which denied
reformation to the grantor, who sought to reduce the quantity of the. land conveyed,
because the deed described a specific tract and there was no reference to quantity.
42. Murrell v. United States, 269 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1959).
43. 122 So.2d 218 (Fla. App. 1960).
44. 121 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1960).
45. Siesta Properties, Inc., v. Hart, 122 So.2d 218 (Fla. App. 1960)..
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that the object of subsequent surveys is to locate the lines of the first, not
to correct them. 40  Resolution of boundary disputes by acquiescence and
parol agreement also received judicial attention, 47 and in applying principles
of adverse possession to boundary disputes, one appellate court rejected
the contention that fencing in the disputed strip with the owned land would
constitute adverse possession under color of title,48 while another appellate
court reached the opposite conclusion. 49
Conflicting claims as to the boundaries of land embraced within a
Spanish grant, which arose under federal treaty and law, were held not a
federal question giving rise to federal jurisdiction.5"
Estoppel Against State; Sovereignty Lands, or the State Can Also
Make a Mistake and Be Held to It
The Supreme Court of Florida has done much in Trustees of the
Internal Improvement Fund v. Lobean5' to remove the reluctance with
which the courts have generally applied, or rather declined to apply, the
principle of estoppel against the state. The case was a suit to enjoin the
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund from selling land which they
had previously conveyed to the plaintiff by a Murphy tax deed.52  The
Murphy deed was void because the land involved was submerged sov-
ereignty land, hence not subject to taxation. The case was similar, there-
fore, to two recent cases53 which had refused to apply an estoppel against
the state under analogous circumstances. In upholding an estoppel, the
court simply stated that the circumstances were not sufficient to negate
a legal estoppel.54
In arriving at its conclusion, however, the court in the Lobean55 case
46. International Paper Co. v. Bridges, 279 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1960) (inherent in
the decision); Froscher v. Fuchs, 130 So.2d 300 (Fla. App. 1961); St. Joe Paper Co. v.
Gulf Mosquito Control Dist., 125 So.2d 895 (Fla. App. 1961); Calder v. Hillsboro Land
Co., 122 So.2d 445 (Fla. App. 1960).
47. International Paper Co. v. Bridges, 279 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1960); Lubrano v.
Macauley, 125 So.2d 911 (Fla. App. 1961).
48. Blackburn v. Florida West Coast Land & Dev. Co., 109 So.2d 413 (Fla. App.
1959), cert. denied, 114 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1959).
Adverse possession was held established in Lubrano v. Macauley, 125 So.2d 911(Fla. App. 1961); Leighton v. Johns, 116 So.2d 436 (Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied, 122
So.2d 405 (Fla. 1960).
49. Kiser v. Howard, 133 So.2d 746 (Fla. App. 1961).
50. Huckins v. Duval County, 286 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 945 (1961).
51. 127 So.2d 98 (Fla. 1961), discharging cert. and approving, Lobean v. Trustees
of the Internal Improvement Fund, 118 So.2d 226 (Fla. App. 1960).
52. As to Murphy deeds generally, see BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS§ 31.04 (1959).
53. Ruyle v. Dolly, 110 So.2d 467 (Fla. App. 1959); Adams v. Crews, 105 So.2d 584
l Fla. App. 1958), both discussed in Boyer, Survey of Real Property Law, 14 U. MIAmi L.
EV. 638, 668 (1960).
54. Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v. Lobean, 127 So.2d 98 (Fla. 1961).
55. Ibid.
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pointed out the difference between legal and equitable estoppel, the latter
depending upon conduct, the former upon recitals in documents, and dealt
with the contention that whenever legal estoppel was applied against the
state, equitable estoppel was also present. It recognized that the court
had previously stated that for an estoppel to apply against the state, special
and exceptional circumstances had to be shown, but noted sadly that the
court had never defined what constituted such exceptional and special cir-
cumstances. Declining still to define such circumstances, or better, to
overrule or "recede from" previous lugubrious statements, the majority
chose simply to apply a legal estoppel.
The short concurring opinion of Justice Drew56 is clearer and broader
in its application. It struck at the core of the matter by saying that in
this day and age when the state is engaged in almost every type of business
activity, the argument that legal estoppel should not apply against the state
is unsound. It boldly stated that, except in those instances where its
application would affect the sovereign power of the state in its purely
governmental functions, the doctrine of estoppel should apply against the
state to the same extent as it applies against individuals. It seems unfortunate
that the majority did not adopt this clear, concise, and policy-wise viewpoint.
Recording, or the Case of the Bank Which Looked and Waited
The application of the well known principle that possession constitutes
notice under the Florida notice type recording statute5 7 was applied in the
factually interesting case of Lee County Bank v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.58
The purchasers entered into an executory sales contract for land which
was being improved by the builder-seller. After the contract was entered
into, but not recorded, the builder-seller negotiated with the bank for the
execution of a mortgage. The bank carefully inspected the premises and
found that they were unoccupied. Three days later the purchasers went into
occupancy, and on the following day, without reinspecting the premises,
the bank accepted the seller's mortgage. The purchasers later, with the aid
of a mortgage from an insurance company, paid the seller in full. It was
held, quite properly in accordance with the doctrine that possession consti-
tutes notice, or puts subsequent purchasers or mortgagees on inquiry, that
the original purchasers, and their mortgagee also, took free and clear of
the mortgage executed by the seller to the bank.
The Case of the Patient Creditor
The recording act protects subsequent purchasers and mortgagees;
hence to come within its protection, one must be both subsequent and a
56. Id. at 104.
57. FLA. STAT. § 695.01 (1961).
58. 126 So.2d 589 (Fla. App. 1961).
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purchaser, that is, pay value. Although in Florida it has been held that
a pre-existing debt for either a mortgage or deed is not value within the
meaning of the recording act, 59 that rule has been held inapplicable, and
properly so it would seem, when the creditor extends the time of payment
or forbears from bringing suit for a definite period of time in exchange for a
mortgage.60 Such a mortgagee is a purchaser for value within the protec-
tion of the recording provisions.
III. ESTATES, DOWER, HOMESTEAD AND FUTURE INTERESTS
Actuarial Problems Incident to Split Ownership, or Pity the Poor
Remainderman
Only a few of the problems relative to the apportionment of benefits
and burdens incident to split ownership6t have been reported in the deci-
sions of the Florida courts. A recent case02 involved a homestead and dealt
with the relative obligations of the widow and remaindermen in regard
to mortgage interest and principal payments. The case followed the usual
rule that if a mortgage or other incumbrance is outstanding when the
life estate is created, the life tenant may be required to pay the interest
as it falls due, such obligation being considered somewhat of a quid pro
quo for the rents and profits to which the life tenant is entitled. The life
tenant, however, is not required to pay the princial in whole or in part
unless the testator or grantor has expressed in the creating instrument an
intention to that effect. 3 Thus, the life tenant, under homestead status
also, is normally required to pay only interest payments in the absence
of any personal liability on her part.'
Entireties Problems"5
Entireties property continues to be a fruitful source of litigation.
Although the interest of either tenant is obviously not devisable, a joint
and mutual will entered into pursuant to a contract by entireties tenants
is enforceable by the ultimate beneficiary after the death of both parties,6"
59. Gabel v. Drewrys, Ltd., 68 So.2d 372 (Fla. 1953); Zachary Veneer Co. v.
Engelken, 136 Fla. 89, 186 So. 813 (1938).
60. Manufacturer & Traders Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 113 So.2d 869 (Fla.
App. 1959).
61. The problem is discussed generally in 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 668 (1956).
62. Furlong v. Coral Gables Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 121 So.2d 797 (Fla. App.),
cert. denied, 125 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1960).
63. These general principles weie also enunciated in Williams v. Williams, 120
So.2d 202 (Fla. App. 1960).
64. Furlong v. Coral Gables Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 121 So.2d 797 (Fla. App.),
cert. denied, 125 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1960).
65. The reader should also consult the survey article on family law for addi-
tional cases on entireties estates.
66. Ugent v. Boehmke, 123 So.2d 387 (Fla. App. 1960).
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and the underlying contract between the tenants may be oral.67 On divorce,
of course, the parties become tenants in common,68 and unless one of the
parties has an equitable interest over and beyond his legal interest, a decree
other than as tenants in common is improper.69 Some additional cases are
mentioned in the notes.70
Fiduciary Obligations of Cotenants, or the Case of the Unbrotherly Brother
Possession of one cotenant is normally not adverse to the others unless
the claim is clearly and unequivocally brought home to them. This prin-
ciple was applied in the case of a son who went into possession of the
father's homestead before the death of the father. It was held that pos-
session by the son of a portion of the homestead begun before the father's
death was not adverse to his cotenants in remainder after the father's
death,71 in the absence of clear notice of this adverse claim. In another
case,72 the common law rule was followed that an occupying cotenant in
exclusive possession is not liable, in the absence of an agreement, to account
to the other cotenants for reasonable rental value or profits.
Dower, or Some Widows Get More
Two dower cases involving conflict of laws principles ended success-
67. Weiss v. Storm, 126 So.2d 295 (Fla. App. 1961).
68. FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (1961); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 128 So.2d 434, 435 (Fla.
App. 1961) using the terminology "joint tenants, in which relation they are equally
interested"; Bergh v. Bergh, 127 So.2d 481 (Fla. App. 1961); Bailey v. Bailey, 126 So.2d
165 (Fla. App. 1961); Banfi v. Banfi, 123 So.2d 52 (Fla. App. 1960); Jones v. Jones,
121 So.2d 811 (Fla. App. 1960); Latta v. Latta, 121 So.2d 42 (Fla. App. 1960).
69. Latta v. Latta, 121 So.2d 42 (Fla. App. 1960).
70. Where the husband borrowed money ol a promissory note executed by him
alone and promising to pay it out of the proceeds of entireties property, the lender is
entitled to no relief against the property or against a purchase money mortgage executed
therefor to both the husband and wife, since neither husband nor wife acting alone can
cncumber entireties property. Yafanaro v. Ninos, 123 So.2d 286 (Fla. App. 1960).
A husband stockholder made an oral promise to convey entireties property to the
corporation at the time his wife was living separate and apart from him. The corporation
then purportedly executed a mortgage on the land and a business building was erected. It
was held that the mortgagee was not entitled to an equitable lien, and that the wife who
knew nothing of the transaction was not bound by her husband's promise. Penzi v. David,
122 So.2d 635 (Fla. App. 1960).
In Gerson v. Broward County Title Co., 116 So.2d 455 (Fla. App. 1959), after the
sale of entireties property, the abstract company delivered to the husband a check payable
to the husband and wife, the vendors. The husband then forged his wife's name to the
check and absconded. It was held that the abstract company was not liable to the wife
even if there was a fiduciary relationship, that either party (H or WX) presumptively has
the power to act for both as to entireties property so long as the marriage subsists, and
that the husband may accept payment in discharge of a note held by the entireties, pro-
vided that there is no specific agreement between the husband and wife for division of
the property. The court also indicated that liability might attach if there was an
agreement and it was known to the payor.
Property interest held as tenants by the entireties cannot prima facie be reached to
satisfy the original debt or obligation of either party. Kornberg v. Krupka, 118 So.2d 790
(Fla. App. 1960).
71. Vaughn v. Vaughn, 119 So.2d 391 (Fla. App. 1960).
72. Taylor v. Taylor, 119 So.2d 811 (Fla. App. 1960), earlier report, 97 So.2d 323
(Fla. App. 1957).
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fully for the dower claimant in accordance with generally recognized prin-
ciples. In the one,73 a Florida resident died owning an interest in two
partnerships doing business in two other states both of which had adopted
the Uniform Partnership Act. Since under that act a partner's interest
is regarded as personalty, and since the situs of personalty is generally con-
sidered to be the domicile of the decedent, the widow was held entitled to
dower in her husband's partnership interests under Florida law,
In the other case, 4 the widow had previously entered into an ante-
nuptial contract in Canada. The contract had complied with the formalities
required by Canadian law, but it lacked the two witnesses required to bar
dower in realty under Florida law.75  Hence, the contract was ineffective
to bar the dower claim to Florida real estate which was acquired by the
husband subsequent to the execution of the contract.76 The law of the
situs, or the place where the realty is located, generally governs transactions
affecting land. Although the result is legally sustainable, one might well
ask, should this be so? Should one party be allowed to repudiate his
contract validly and fairly made simply because the other party fortuitously
happens to invest in property in another jurisdiction which requires more
formalities in the manner of execution? In another case 77 involving an
antenuptial contract, it was held that noncompliance with a condition
precedent contained in the contract rendered the agreement unenforceable
against the widow.
And Some Widows Get Less
Coleman v. Davis7 8 involved a conveyance without the wife's joinder
by a married man to another woman with whom he apparently lived in an
unorthodox relationship.79  The court refused to impose a constructive
trust in favor of the widow,80 but since the land had been conveyed without
her joinder, she was entitled to dower. The extent of the interest, however,
was limited to the real estate as it existed at the time of alienation, and
did not extend to any improvements erected by the grantee or her
successors. 8'
73. In re Binkow's Estate, 120 So.2d 15 (Fla. App. 1960). See Comment, 16
U. MIAMI L. REV. 92 (1961).
74. Kyle v. Kyle, 128 So.2d 427 (Fla. App. 1961).
75. Zimmerman v. Diedrich, 97 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1957); Petersen v. Brotman, 100
So.2d 821 (Fla. App. 1958).
76. Kyle v. Kyle, 128 So.2d 427 (Fla. App. 1961).
77. Cohen v. Rothman, 127 So.2d 143 (Fla. App. 1961).
78. 120 So.2d 56 (Fla. App. 1960); an earlier decision in this case, 106 So.2d 81
(Fla. App. 1958), is noted in Boyer, Survey of Real Property Law, 14 U. MIAMI L. RE~v.
638, 657 (1960).
79. This matter is indicated in the earlier report, Coleman v. Davis, 106 So.2d 81
(Fla. App. 1958).
80. Ibid.
81. Coleman v. Davis, 120 So.2d 56 (Fla. App. 1960). The court stated that this
was the majority rule, and it refused to follow an English decision granting dower in the
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Although it is popularly said to be within the province of the female
of the species to change her mind, this was not permitted in Youngelson V.
Youngelson's Estate. °2 In this case, the widow entered into a settlement
agreement with the executor and heirs of the husband after his death, and
then changed her mind and applied for dower within the period allowed
for filing the election. It was held that she was barred of both dower and
homestead rights, the court stating that these agreements are presumptively
valid and can be set aside only on a showing of fraud or overreaching.
Some additional dower cases are found in the notes.83
Husband's joinder in the Wife's Deed, or the Case of the Valid Void Deed
Is a deed by a married woman who is not a free dealer84 really void
as it is generally stated," ' or is it only maybe void? Consider the case of
Hill v. Lurnmus.86 0 made a gratuitous conveyance to M, a married woman,
to defeat creditors. Then M conveyed without the joinder of her husband
to A, a party designated by 0. Later M, joined by her husband, conveyed
the same land to B on the representation that the land would go to O's estate.
It was held that 0 and her administrator were estopped from claiming
that the property belonged to the estate on the ground that the conveyance
to M was invalid as a fraudulent conveyance, and although the deed to A
was void because of the husband's nonjoinder, title was nevertheless quieted
in A (the grantee of the "void" deed), and the deed to B was cancelled.
If comments are in order, one might first question the wisdom of the
statute and the decisions rendering void the deed of a married woman
whose husband does not join in its execution. Why not give him an
interest similar to that of the wife's dower and put the parties on an equal
property as it existed at the husband's death. It stated that the common law was not
restricted to that declared by the courts of England, but included also that declared by
the courts of the United States.
82. 114 So.2d 642 (Fla. App. 1959).
83. The county judge's court has jurisdiction over dower, and the decision of the
county judge as to the allowance of dower is not subject to collateral attack by suit for
declaratory relief. Stahl v. Wilson, 121 So.2d 662 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 125
So.2d 873 (Fla. 1960).
That no guardian for an incompetent widow was appointed until after nine months
following publication of the first notice to creditors does not toll the running of the
statute'pertaining to the filing of the election, and such election cannot be filed after the
guardian is'appointed. In re Aron's Estate, 118 So.2d 546 (Fla. App. 1960).
Whether the United States would have priority over the dower interest of the
widow under federal statute, REV. STAT. § 3466 (1875) 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1958), according
priority to the United States government when the estate of the decedent has insufficient
assets to pay all debts, was held not properly before the court in United States v. Dahl-
berg, 115 So.2d 86 (Fla. App. 1959). Since the record on appeal did not show that
there were insufficient assets to pay all claims at the time the order of payment to the
widow was made, the appellate court would not consider the question and the order of
payment was affirmed.
84. Statutes relative to free dealership are FLA. STAT. §8 62.38-.46 (1961).
85. FLA. STAT. §§ 693.01, 708.04, 708.08 (1961); Phillips v. Lowenstein, 91 Fla.
89, 107 So. 350 (1926); Vilkins v. Lewis, 78 Fla. 78, 82 So. 762 (1919).
86. 123 So.2d 365 (Fla. App. 1960).
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basis, thus upholding the deed subject to the unreleased interest of the
spouse? 7  Or perhaps better yet, why not abolish all inchoate dower and
similar interests and permit either husband or wife freely to alienate his
separate property?88 Admittedly, changes such as these require legislative
action and may meet opposition.
A second commentary, recognizing existing conveyancing requirements
and husband and wife interests, might be based on the underlying policy
implicit in the outcome of the above litigation.8 Obviously, fraudulent
conveyances to defeat creditors are to be prevented or discouraged. 0 and
her administrator are punished in the above case by not letting the estate
get the land back, hence, to this extent others may be discouraged from
attempting these undesirable activities. It must be noted, however, that
the prophylactic effect of the decision will largely be wasted on 0 who
has now gone to her reward and, presumably, will not be making any more
conveyances anyway. Further, the result is that A obtains a windfall, and
as a result of a void deed. It would seem that the policy prohibiting
fraudulent conveyances seeks to protect creditors and is not simply a policy
of preventing these conveyances in the abstract. The end result in the
above case affords no protection to creditors; it simply gives the land to A.
Of course, all the creditors may have been paid, or they may now be
barred by the statute of limitations, 0 but the opinion does not indicate that
this is so. In any event, if there are creditors, it would appear that the
better policy would be to put the land back in the estate of the original
owner, and this could be easily done by declaring all the deeds void since
it does not appear that any of the grantees were bona fide purchasers.
87. Under the present statutory scheme in Florida, a deed by a married man without
his wife's joinder passes title subject to her dower interest, which is a potential one-third
interest in fee simple and which will become consummate only if she survives her husband
and files an election to take dower within the time allotted. The husband has no similar
interest in the wife's realty, but her deed without his joinder is "void" unless she is a
free dealer.
88. The suggestion here is the abolishment only of inchoate interests. Either or
both of the spouses could and should be given an interest in the property owned by the
other spouse at the time of his death. Present Florida law permits a husband without his
wife's joinder to freely transfer personal property owned by him, but the wife may claim
dower (equivalent to a statutory share of one-third) in that personalty owned by him at
the time of his death. Under present Florida law, the wife may completely disinherit the
husband, but he cannot disinherit her. Herzog v. Trust Co., 67 Fla. 54, 64 So. 426(1914). Inchoate dower and the corresponding interest of the husband have been abol-
ished in New York with each spouse being given a forced statutory share in the interest
of the property owned by the other at the time of death. See N. Y. RPAL PROP. LA\W§§ 189, 190; N. Y. DECED. EST. LAw § 18.
89. Hill v. Lummus, 123 So.2d 365 (Fla. App. 1960).
90. There is the possibility also that the statute of limitations would be tolled by
the fraudulent conveyance so that the creditors would not be barred. Further, if there are
in fact no unpaid creditors, do not the heirs or devisees of decedent have a claim equally
as meritorious as that of A?
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Homestead, Including the Tale of How Mother and Son
Outwitted the Bride
Simpson v. Simpson9 was a case of first impression involving the
priority of a mortgage executed to secure future advances and a. homestead
status established after the execution of the mortgage, but before the
advances were made. At the time W married H and moved into his home,
thus establishing a homestead, there was a recorded mortgage against the
land to secure future advances. The mortgagee was the mother of H, and
there was an obligation on her part to make the advances on the demand
of H. The payments were subsequently made. W, of course, had not
joined in the execution of either the note or mortgage.
After the death of H, the mortgagee mother brought an action to
enforce the mortgage, and W defended on the basis of no valid lien at the
time when the homestead status attached. If this were correct, the mort-
gage, of course, would be invalid since it was not jointly executed by both
husband and wife.92
The mortgagee prevailed, the court holding that the mortgage was a
valid lien against the homestead. 3  The statute9 4 authorizing mortgages
for future advances was cited. The court also applied the general rule that
a mortgage for future advances becomes an effective lien from the time
of its execution, or as to subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers, from
the time of its recordation, rather than from the time the advance is made,
when the making of the advances is obligatory upon and not merely
optional with the mortgagee. 5
Thus, when the money was subsequently advanced, the consideration
related back to the time of recording the mortgage, and it became a valid
lien against the homestead. Whether the result would have been different
if the advances were optional rather than obligatory, or whether the optional
characteristic of future advances would make a difference in other than
homestead cases, was not expressly determined.
As a general proposition, the writer is in accord with the rule recognizing
the validity of mortgages for future advances, and even sees nothing wrong
with the apparent policy of the Florida statute which in terms9" makes no
distinction between obligatory and voluntary advances. Subsequent pur-
chasers and incumbrancers are charged with notice of the potential or
91. 123 So.2d 289 (Fla. App. 1960), earlier report, 113 So.2d 766 (Fla. App. 1959).
92. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
93. Simpson v. Simpson, 123 So.2d 289 (Fla. App. 1960).
94. FLA. STAT. § 697.04 (1959). This statute was amended in 1961, FLA. LAws
1961, ch. 61-135, to extend the time during which future advances may be secured from
ten years to twenty years.
95. See Annot., 5 A.L.R. 398, 399 (1920); 59 C.J.S., Mortgages § 230(a)(2)(194.See FLA. STAT. § 697.04 (1961).
1961]
154 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW V
inchoate lien as a result of the recorded mortgage and should react
accordingly.
Nevertheless, it is believed that a serious constitutional question was
involved in the instant litigation, and that the court did not sufficiently
dispose of this phase of the widow's case. Basically, a mortgage is security
for a debt; it is the ancillary appendage of a dual transaction; it has no
independent statusY7  Without a debt or other obligation to secure there
can be no mortgage.
Thus, until the advances are made, there is no debt, and consequently
no mortgage or lien. In the instant case, therefore, there was no debt,
hence no valid mortgage, at the time homestead status attached. The
constitution requires that both husband and wife, when that relationship
exists, join in the execution of a conveyance or incumbrance of the home-
stead.98 Since the wife did not join in the execution of this mortgage, it
was obviously void except for the fiction of the relation back. The use
of the fiction may be desirable, particularly if it is realized that the same
type of argument may be utilized to favor subsequent purchasers and
mortgagees in other than homestead cases. The fact is simply noted that
a fiction, supported by legislative policy as embodied in the statute recog-
nizing mortgages for future advances, is used to circumvent a constitutional
mandate and a strong policy of protecting homestead rights. It is suggested
that the court might have directed a frontal attack against these conflicting
policies.
Homestead, Routine Applications
Among the many controversies continually arising relative to the Florida
homestead law, the following more or less routine applications of estab-
lished principles are recorded: in the case of duplexes or dwelling units
in a multiple family building, the various owners are collectively entitled
to only one exemption for tax purposes;09 if the premises are rented for
only part of the year, the fact that the owners do not actually live on the
premises on the first of the year does not deprive them of the right to
the tax exemption; 0 0 the requirement that the homestead be "owned" by
the head of the family is not construed too strictly, the requirement having
been satisfied in one case when the homestead was originally held by a
personal corporation which was later dissolved for nonpayment of taxes,
the court concluding that the man in question had a homestead all the
97. See generally BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §§ 32.01, .08 (1959).
98. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
99. Gautier v. State, 127 So.2d 68; (Fla. App. 1961); earlier case to the same
effect, Overstreet v. Tubin, 53 So.2d 913 (Fla. 1951).
100. Poppel v. Padrick, 117 So.2d 435 (Fla. App. 1959). The reader is also
referred to 1959 legislation, (FLA. STAT. § 192.141 (1959)), which provides that rental of
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time; 01 headship and ownership must be joined in one individual for
homestead status to attach, homestead law not applying where one other
than the head of the family owns the land, or where the owner of the
land has no one dependent on him;11 02 and finally, gratuitous conveyances
to avoid the normal rules relative to the descent of homesteads are gener-
ally declared void. 1'03
Options
An option to repurchase in the form of a right of first refusal, to last
for a period of twelve years, was held valid in Blair v. Kingsley.04 Options in
gross105 are subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities, but otherwise are gen-
erally held valid.' 05 Since the particular option was well within the period
of the rule, it was obviously valid from the perpetuities viewpoint.
Direct restraints on alienation of fees simple are generally held void
regardless of the period of the restraint.'0 7  Options generally do not fall
within the prohibition of this rule because in form they do not prevent
alienation. On the contrary, the optionee can coerce alienation, but aliena-
tion to others is undoubtedly somewhat hampered. 08 Realistically, however,
pre-emptive options appear designed more to prevent alienation' 9 than to
promote it. Nevertheless, this purpose usually seems to be overlooked,
and as long as the. restriction is cast in the form of an option, it is upheld
provided the Rule Against Perpetuities is not violated. 10
An additional feature in the Blair"' case made the similarity to a
restraint on alienation even more marked. The optionee was given a one
year period in which to exercise his option. Although the adverse effect of
this feature on saleability was urged on the court, it did not expressly
discuss the reasonableness of this provision or the possibility of its operating
an entire dwelling results in the loss of homestead taxation exemption subject to certain
exceptions and limitations.
101. Manda v. Sinclair, 278 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1960).
102. Abernathy v. Gruppo, 119 So.2d 398 (Fla. App. 1960).
103. Reed v. Fain, 122 So.2d 322 (Fla. App. 1960). In Quinn v. Miles, 124 So.2d
883 (Fla. App. 1960), it was held that the first wife from whom the decedent had never
been divorced was entitled to a life estate in the homestead rather than the "third wife"
with whom lie was living at the time of his death.
Where there are no lineal descendants at the time of death, the homestead vests
absolutely in the surviving spouse. Freeman v. Holland, 122 So.2d 791 (Fla. App. 1960).
104. 128 So.2d 889 (Fla. App. 1961).
105. By an option in gross is meant an option unconnected with a lease.
106. 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 771, at 601 (1956).
107. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 22.08 (1959).
108. 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 771 (1956).
109. See, for example, 6 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, 842, at 12 (1958). See also 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 26.64-.67 (1952), for a more complete discussion of
different types of pre-emption agreements and their relationship to restraints on alienation.
110. 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 771 (1956); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 24.56 (1952); Blair v. Kingsley, 128 So.2d 889 (Fla. App. 1961).
111. Blair v. Kingsley, supra note 110.
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as a direct restraint on alienation. It would seem that during the period
of discretion on the part of the optionee, alienation is effectively restrained,
and that the court might well conclude that an option, particularly a pre-
emptive option, which allows the optionee too long a time to exercise his
discretion, is invalid as constituting a direct restraint on alienation.
Construction of Instruments
Several instruments necessitated judicial construction of the type of
interest retained or created. A limitation following a life estate "to A, B
and C or their survivors or survivor" was held to impose a condition of
survivorship, and hence the parties acquired contingent rather than vested
remainders, the condition being that they survive the life tenant. 112 Other
constructions included the following: a recital in a deed which declares
what use is contemplated does not affect the passing of the fee effected
by other parts of the deed, hence in the particular case, a fee was conveyed
and not simply an easement;1I3 an ambiguous "exception" of a designated
area, "same being reserved for a right of way," was held to reserve only an
easement rather than to have excepted the fee;" 4 and a reservation of an
easement by one state instrumentality in favor of another was held effec-
tive,1" 5 the rule that an easement cannot be reserved in favor of a third
party being inapplicable.
TV. EASEMENTS, COVENANTS, WATER LAW AND ZONING
A Marriage of Convenience: Easements and Dedication
Purchasers taking land in reliance on a plat acquire a private easement
by implication in the streets and other public lands depicted thereon.'10
Recording a plat constitutes merely an offer to dedicate the streets and
other public lands delineated on the plat, and until acceptance the offer
can be revoked."17  The reconciliation of these principles caused a bit of
112. Lawyer v. Munro, 118 So.2d 654 (Fla. App. 1960).
113. Robb v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 117 So.2d 534 (Fla. App. 1960).
114. Lynch v. Welan Inv. Co., 126 So.2d 148 (Fla. Apt. 1961).
115. Dade County v. Little, 115 So.2d 19 (Fla. App. 1959).
116. See BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE 'IRANSACTIONS§ 23.03[3] [d] (1959). See
also cases cited in notes 120 and 121 infra.
In Dinkins v. Julian, 122 So.2d 620 (Fla. App. 1960), not involving acquisition of
casements arising from a conveyance in reference to a plat, the court reaffirmed the prin-
ciple that unity of title is necessary for the implication of easements, and denied an ease-
ment to purchasers who relied on the continued existence of a county road so that they
would have comer lots. The developers later acquired land on the other side of the road
and planned to have it closed. Although it is undoubtedly correct that the purchasers
were not entitled to an easement by implication, it would seem that the developers
should be estopped from terminating the easement or roadway after they had induced
others to purchase in reliance on its continuance.
117. See BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §§ 23.03[3] [d], 30.04, 30.05
[1] (1959). See also cases cited in notes 120 and 121 infra.
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difficulty in two cases" 8 where the dedicator attempted a revocation and
was thwarted in both instances. Perhaps the net result is summarized in
the court's observation that there appears to be a "blending of public right
resulting from an offer of dedication with private rights growing out of
implied covenant, implied grant, or estoppel of the dedicator.""'
In Weber v. City of Hollywood,"120 a summary judgment was awarded
against both the city claiming a street dedication and against the landowner
claiming that the offer of dedication had been revoked before acceptance.
Since the city did not appeal the summary judgment against it, the court,
considering and affirming only the judgment against the landowner, indi-
cated that the dedication was complete and that the city had paramount
rights. Both parties had resorted to self-help-the land owner by digging
a ditch and the city by closing it - and the suit involved claims for damages
by each party against the other for having taken this action. The court
concluded that neither the purported dedicator nor his successor could
unilaterally revoke the offer to dedicate.
In Cross v. City of Miami,1-1 it was held that an attempt by a sub-
divider to revoke a dedication of a strip of land lying between a street and
the waters of a bay by conveying ownership to purchasers of the land on the
opposite side of the street was ineffective. The case moves with facility from
a consideration of easement principles to those of dedication, and the
result seems equally sustainable on the principle that there was a complete
dedication because the offer had been accepted before the attempted revo-
cation, and on the proposition that because of the acquisition of private
rights of easement acquired by purchasers relying on plats, the dedicator
could not revoke.
The apparent blending of dedication and easement principles in the
above two cases may result in obliterating, or at least eroding, well defined
and theoretical distinctions between the two concepts, but the court may
believe that pragmatically this is the best approach to problems of this nature.
Validity of Statuory Easements of Necessity
A district court of appeal in Stein v. Darby1- - upheld the constitu-
tionality of the statute granting an easement for certain purposes to land-
locked realty, and then certified the case to the supreme court for determi-
nation of a jurisdictional question as a matter of great public interest. In
arriving at its conclusion, the district court examined the basis of the common-
118. Cross v. City of Miami, 121 So.2d 664 (Fla. App. 1960); Weber v. City of
1ollywood, 120 So.2d 826 (Fla. App. 1960).
119. Weber v. City of Hollywood, supra note 118, at 829.
120. 120 So.2d 826 (Fla. App. 1960).
121. 121 So.2d 664 (Fla. App. 1960).
122. 126 So.2d 313 (Fla. App. 1961), earlier decision, 114 So.2d 368 (Fla. App.
1959). The statutes involved are FLA. STAT. §§ 704.01-.04 (1961).
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law easement of necessity, and concluded that in reality these easements are
based on public policy, and that assertions of implication from an inferred
intent of the parties is simply rationalization. The statute was said to
serve the same public policy of making land available for development by
providing a means of access.
The earlier case of South Dade Farms, Inc. v. B. & L. Farms Co.1 23
was differentiated in Stein v. Darby by stating that the suggestion there
was to the effect that the statute as then written was invalid as a deprivation
of private property without due process of law, and that the method of
providing compensation in the present statute cured that defect.
Other cases involving the statutory easement held that one claiming
this easement cannot be restricted to a trail across a slough which becomes
impassable for three months when, by shifting the roadway a few feet to
higher ground, a proper means of access would be obtained, 24 and that in
appropriating a right of way, the chancellor should first delineate the route,
and then the question of compensation should be presented to a 'jury. 125
Covenants - Racial Discrimination Through Club Membership
A club membership device to secure racial or religious discrimination
in land occupancy was invalidated by the Supreme Court of Florida in
Harris v. Sunset Islands Property Owners, Inc.126
In this case Mr. Harris, a member of the Jewish faith, purchased a
lot in a subdivision restricted so as to prohibit the sale, lease or occupancy
by others than members of a designated property owners association. By-
laws of the association restricted membership to caucasian gentiles. After
Mr. Harris' purchase and before litigation, the by-laws were amended to
delete reference to caucasian gentiles and to restrict membership to persons
of good moral character. After this amendment, Mr. Harris applied for
membership and was refused.
It was held that the change in by-laws could have no effect on this
litigation, since Mr. Harris purchased his land when the by-laws precluded
membership by one of his faith. Further, the by-laws had to be construed
in connection with the recorded restrictions. Thus, the combined effect of
the dual restrictions was a discrimination within the doctrine of Shelley v.
Kraemer 21 and the many cases adhering to it, and thus was unenforceable.128
123. 62 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1952). The case is discussed in Boycr, Survey of Real
Property Law, 8 MIAMI L.O. 389, 423 (1954), and in BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS § 23.03[3][ej, at 521 (1959).
124. Bradshaw v. Prasek, 114 So.2d 821 (Fla. App. 1959).
125. Surrency v. Indian River County, 116 So.2d 782 (Fla. App. 1959).
126. 116 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1959).
127. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
128. Harris v. Sunset Islands Property Owners, Inc., 116 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1959).
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The court cautiously limited its holding to the facts of the case, namely,
a recorded restriction limiting occupancy to membership of an association,
and concurrent by-laws of the association limiting membership to particular
racial or ethnic groups. No opinion was expressed as to the validity of the
provisions under the amended by-laws. Thus, the enforceability of provi-
sions restricting land occupancy to members of a designated association
without reference to race or religion, the membership in the association
being limited to persons of good moral character, good fellowship, or con-
geniality, was not determined. It may be suggested, however, that when
proof of a prohibited discriminatory practice is presented, the court will
not be powerless to disregard form over substance.
Before leaving the Harris case, it might also be suggested that the
prohibition against the sale or leasing to anybody other than club members
is undoubtedly an illegal restraint on alienation and void. 129  A restriction
on occupancy or use is generally regarded as valid so long as it does not
contravene some aspect of public policy such as that enunciated in Shelley
v. Kraemer.130 Rather than casting the restriction in the form of a restraint
on alienation, an option to purchase should be accorded the association
or club in the event the particular owner desires to sell. Such an option,
if properly drawn, will probably be upheld.13 1
Additional cases involving covenants may be found in the notes. 3 2
Water Law and Submerged Land
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the Submerged
Lands Act granted to the State of Florida a three marine-league belt of
submerged land under the Gulf of Mexico seaward from its coastline."'3
The coastline was defined, for the purposes of the decision, as the line of
ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact
with the open sea, and the line marking the seaward limit of inland
waters.' 34
Within the state of Florida, the application of the principle of legal
estoppel to sales by the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund of
submerged sovereignty land was a significant development which has already
129. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 22.08 (1959).
130. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
131. See Blair v. Kingsley, 128 So.2d 889 (Fla. App. 1961).
132. Where forfeiture or other provisions for termination or reverter are not
expressed, the courts will likely construe expressions of intended use as covenants rather
than as limitations on the fee. Robb v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 117 So.2d 534
(Fla. App. 1960).
The operation of a motel was held to be a commercial enterprise violative of a
restrictive covenant in Malcolm v. Smith, 112 So.2d 395 (Fla. App. 1959).
A covenant against the sale of alcoholic beverages was upheld in Hevia v. Palm
Terrace Fruit Co., 119 So.2d 795 (Fla. App. 1960).
133. United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960)
134. United States v. Louisiana, 364 U.S. 502 (1960).
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been discussed.13', The Florida Supreme Court has adopted the civil law
rule as being applicable to the use of non-navigable lakes by abutting
owners. This rule provides that "the whole lake .. . [can] be used by any
owner of a part of the bottom subject, of course, to the rights of those in
like situation.' 3 6  Other appellate decisions have reached conclusions con-
sistent with established principles. 137
Zoning
Zoning controversies continue to be a fruitful source of litigation, but
the legal principles are generally well established, and most of the disputes
ultimately rest on factual determinations. Of special significance was the
supreme court decision in Board of Comm'rs v. Tallahassee Bank 6 Trust
Co.,138 which upheld the appellate court's decision 39 that an ordinance was
invalid because it classified the property in question as residential, not
because of its suitability for this purpose, but in order to lessen the com-
pensation which would have to be paid on a later condemnation for park
purposes by the state.
The court found no conflict with 'a prior case,140 because it said the
ordinance there was fairly debatable whereas in the instant case it was not.
There was also said to be more urgency presented in the factual situation of
the earlier case which involved the preservation to the public in Miami
Beach of some access to the ocean, light and air, than in creating a Capitol
Park in Tallahassee. In addition, the "Texas Rule" in arriving at market
value in condemnation cases was specifically approved. This permits a
consideration of all the uses to which the property is reasonably adaptable
and for which it either is or probably will become available within the
reasonably foreseeable future. Thus, where an invalid ordinance unreason-
ably restricts the use of the land, in a condemnation suit evidence of the
value if the land were zoned more realistically may be introduced.1 4'
Among the more or less routine dispositions of zoning controversies
135. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
136. Duval v. Thomas, 114 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. 1959), approving Duval v. Thomas,
107 So.2d 148 (Fla. App. 1958). The case is discussed in a note, 14 U. MIAMI L. REv.
689 (1960).
137. Florio v. State, 119 So.2d 305 (Fla. App. 1960), held that water skiing activi-
ties as then carried on constituted a nuisance, but predicated the decision on a doctrinc
of equalitarian rights.
The owner of landlocked lakes was granted an injunction against the discharge of
sewage effluent into the lakes on the basis of a continuing trespass and nuisance in North
Dade Water Co. v. Adken Land Co., 130 So.2d 894 (Fla. App. 1961).
138. 116 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1959).
139. Board of Comm'rs v. Tallahassec Bank & '1'rust Co., 108 So.2d 74 (Fla. App.
1958).
140. City of Miami Beach v. Hogan, 63 So.2d 493 (Fla.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.819 (1953), holding that the court will not invalidate an otherwise valid ordinance
for the purpose of increasing the amount that a city will have to pay in pending con-
demnation proceedings.141. Board of Comm'rs v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 116 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1959).
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were the following: an ordinance was held not invalid for vagueness or
uncertainty because it used the word "building" without defining it;1 42 a
"Royal Castle" type of hamburger dispensary was adjudged a "restaurant"
within the terms of an ordinance permitting restaurants; 143 the controversial
Miami Beach "hot plate" ordinance Was held unreasonable and void;144 an
ordinance granting a "variance" in favor of two lots after a contrary determi-
nation by a Zoning and Planning Board was invalidated as "spot" zoning;14'
and that "a line must be drawn somewhere" was held no justification for
zoning a particular parcel for single family residences when the land was
unsuited for such purposes.' 46 Additional cases are found in the notes. 47
V. ADVERSE POSSESSION, DEDICATION, TAX TITLES AND EMINENT DOMAIN
Adverse Possession and Statutes of Limitation
Section 95.25 of the Florida Statutes, providing that cooperative fire pro-
tection between the owner and the board of forestry constitutes adverse
142. Union Trust Co. v. Lucas, 125 So.2d 582 (Fla. App. 1960).
143. City of Miami Beach v. Royal Castle System, Inc., 126 So.2d 595 (Fla.
App. 1961).
144. Fox v. Bancroft Hotel Associates, 128 So.2d 771 (Fla. App. 1961). The
ordinance prohibited use of cooking devices in single family units containing less than 400
square feet and was aimed at business competition in the tourist industry rather than
promoting the safety, health or welfare of the occupants.
145. Friedland v. City of Hollywood, 130 So.2d 306 (Fla. App. 1961). An amenda-
tory ordinance was also invalidated as spot zoning in Cole v. Oka, 131 So.2d 757 (Fla.
App. 1961), earlier report, 107 So.2d 45 (Fla. App. 1958).
146. City of Miami Beach v. Hessick, 117 So.2d 763 (Fla. App.), cert. denied,
122 So.2d 407 (Fla. 1960). But it is not sufficient to have an ordinance nullified by
showing that the property in question is located on the border of another district. The
line must be drawn somewhere. Town of Surfside v. Skyline Terrace Corp., 120 So.2d 20
(Fla. App. 1960), cert. denied, 123 So.2d 675 (Fla. 1960).
147. Rezoning is a legislative matter, and the courts should not specify what uses
should be permitted. Wood v. Twin Lakes Mobile Homes Village, Inc., 123 So.2d 738
(Fla. App. 1960).
Where changes in the area are insufficient to justify a different conclusion, the
principle of res judicata ma be applied to zoning controversies. City of Miami Beach v.
Parking Facilities, Inc., 120 So.2d 209 (Fla. App. 1960), cert. denied, 125 So.2d 873
(Fla. 1960).
An ordinance limiting the size of signs in business districts and classifying them as
at "point of sale" and "non point of sale," with different limitations applicable to each,
was held invalid and discriminatory in Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So.2d 611
(Fla. 1960), quashing 114 So.2d 377 (Fla. App. 1959).
In City of North Miami v. Benjamin, 128 So.2d 753 (Fla. App. 1961), set-back
provisions of an ordinance were held invalid where they would have permitted development
of a strip only five feet wide of a lot 250 x 50 feet.
Economic gain to the owner of a single piece of property is not sufficient cause to
justify an amendment to the ordinance reclassifying such property. Cole v. Oka, 131
So.2d 757 (Fla. App. 1961), earlier report, 107 So.2d 45 (Fla. App. 1958).
Whether property is so situated as to justify interference with ownership in order to
preserve the aesthetics of the community depends on the testimony and evidence in the
case. City of Daytona Beach v. Abdo, 118 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1960), approving 112 So.2d
398 (Fla. App. 1959).
The owner must first exhaust his administrative remedies where the ordinance is
attacked only on the basis of its application to specific property. Wood v. Twin Lakes
Mobile Homes Village, Inc., 123 So.2d 738 (Fla. App. 1960).
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possession, was repealed in 1961.148 Otherwise, there was very little devel-
opment in this field. Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely4 " reviewed much of
the law on adverse possession and prescription in the process of which it
reaffirmed the proposition that the seven-year period applies to adverse
possession and that the twenty-year period applies to prescriptive easements,
and stated that the rule prohibiting the alienation of land adversely possessed
does not apply to land over which the adverse claimant is perfecting an
easement only.5 0
Adverse possession of the subsurface mineral estate coupled with
estoppel were the principal issues in Lykes Bros., Inc. v. McConnel.151  In
this case a mortgagee purchased land at a defective foreclosure, and later
his heirs conveyed the land to a grantee, in which conveyance there was an
express reservation of certain mineral rights. It was held that the grantee
acquired title to the entire estate by adverse possession since there was no
severance of the mineral estate prior to the defective foreclosure, but the
grantee in turn was estopped from asserting any title to the mineral estate
in derogation of the written deed under which he acquired possession. Thus,
his possession inured to the benefit of his grantors. Cases involving disputed
boundaries have been previously discussed .1 12  The rule153 that adverse
possession does not run against a remainderman was applied also to an
expectancy under the homestead provisions,'- 4 and the same case held
that the twenty-year statute of limitations was not a bar to have a void
conveyance set aside, since laches, and not statutes of limitations, bars relief
from stale claims in equitable actions.1 5
The relationship between section 95.23 (a twenty-year statute of limi-
tations), and section 92.08 of the Florida Statutessla (requiring copies
of instruments recorded twenty years or more to be offered to the opposite
party before being introduced in evidence) was explained in Lefkowitz v.
McQuagge.156 If the party is relying on section 95.23 to perfect a title
recorded for twenty years or more, he need not comply with section 92.08.
148. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-489.
149. 125 So.2d 311 (Fla. App. 1960).
150. Another proposition enunciated was that payment of taxes is not necessary for
the acquisition of a prescriptive casement without color of title. Florida Power Corp. v.
McNeely, 125 So.2d 311 (Fla. App. 1960).
151. 115 So.2d 606 (Fla. App. 1959).
152. See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra.
153. The rule is generally followed in Florida; sce BoY R, FLORIDA REAL. ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS § 29.20 (1959). See also Vaughn v. Vaughn, 119 So.2d 391 (Fla. App.
1960), discussed in text accompanying note 71 supra, holding that adverse possession
begun before death of the father was not adverse to the claimant's cotenants in remainder.
154. Reed v. Fain, 122 So.2d 322 (Fla. App. 1960).
155. Ibid. Accord, as to laches only being applicable to equitable actions: Garrett
v. Oak Hall Club, 118 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1960), earlier report, 112 So.2d 603 (Fla. App.
1959).
155a. FLA. STAT. §§ 92.08, 95.23 (1961).
156. 122 So.2d 328 (Fla. App. 1960), cert. denied, 125 So.2d 875 (Fla. 1960).
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Section 92.08 is designed for those situations where the recorded deed
is offered to establish the truth of the recitals contained in those instruments.
Dedication
The principal development in this area, relating to a blending of dedi-
cation principles with those of easements, has been previously discussed.15 7
One of those cases, however, is worthy of additional comment. Cross v. City
of Miami'58 affirmed the chancellor's finding that certain portions of the
disputed strip were owned by the city in fee. Thus, in the particular
instance, dedication apparently resulted in the city acquiring a fee rather
than an easement, but the result may be justified because the dedicatory
language contained no reverter. On the principle of acceptance, the case
is more questionable. It cited Earle v. McCarty' 9 for the proposition
that a dedication by deed is accepted when the instrument is accepted. In
the instant case, however, the dedication was contained in the language
of four plats which did not appear to be equivalent to a deed conveying the
fee to the city. It is generally held in Florida that filing a plat constitutes
merely an offer to dedicate.' 60 Other cases held that conversion of a
highway to a limited access facility does not constitute an abandonment
of a dedication,' 6' and that a city has the power to lease a portion of a
dedicated park for use as a little league baseball field.' 62
Tax Titles
The few cases involving tax titles reaffirmed or pertained to such
established principles as: a tax deed issued for land not subject to taxation
is void; 163 a faulty description in the assessment and tax certificate renders
the resulting tax title void;164 and in a quiet title proceeding a summary
judgment is not proper when it appears that an answer might be filed
presenting a lawful issue which could affect the sufficiency or validity of
the tax deed. 165 The statute stating that a tax deed "shall be prima facie
evidence of the regularity of all proceedings"' 66 aided the court in upholding
a tax deed in Lewis v. Carlisle.167  In this case the taxes were assessed in
157. See text accompanying notes 116-21 supra.
158. 121 So.2d 664 (Fla. App. 1960).
159. 70 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1954).
160. See note 117 supra.
161. Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Anhoco Corp., 107 So.2d 51 (Fla. App.
1958), modified, 116 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1959), 117 So.2d 15, 16 (Fla. App. 1959); connected
case, Anhoco Corp. v. Dade County, 127 So.2d 464 (Fla. App. 1961).
162. Florida Little Major League Ass'n. v. Gulfport Lion's Little League, Inc., 127
So.2d 707 (Fla. App. 1961).
163. Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v. Lobcan, 127 So.2d 98 (Fla.
1961), approving 118 So.2d 226 (Fla. App. 1960). The case, however, applied estoppel
against the state. See text following note 51 sup a.
164. Allison v. Rogero, 112 So.2d 578 (Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied, 115 So.2d
415 (Fla. 1959).
165. Lehew v. Larsen, 124 So.2d 872 (Fla. App. 1960).
166. FLA. STAT. § 194.24 (1961).
167. 118 So.2d 662 (Fla. App. 1960). The deed involved was apparently an
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the name of "P. A. Robinson heirs," whereas title was actually vested in
the heirs of Philip A. Robertson. The chancellor found that at least four
of the Robertson heirs had notice of the sale before it took place. The
chancellor's decree upholding the tax deed was affirmed, the court also
citing the statute providing that "an erroneous statement of the name of
the- owner on the assessment roll shall not invalidate the assessment."' 168
Eminent Domain: Permissible Exercise of Power
The exercise of the power of eminent domain for the accomplishment
of an urban renewal project was upheld in Grubstein v. Urban Renewal
Agency.1' 9 The court stated that the fact that the agency may sell or lease
project area property to private interests after the land has been cleared
does not render the condemnation one for a private rather than a public
purpose. The earlier case of Adams v. Housing Authority170 was distin-
guished by the majority of the court on the ground that only blighted areas
were being cleared in that case, whereas slum areas were being cleared in
the instant case. It was also stated that the fact that a few good houses
or property in the district will be taken is immaterial since otherwise the
whole purpose would be thwarted. In another case 171 it was held that
a condemnation proceeding ancillary to the construction of a limited access
facility as a part of an inter-state highway program, prior to the time that
funds had been allocated for construction and before detailed plans had been
completed, did not constitute an abuse of discretion or disclose that no
public purpose existed.
Procedure and Damages
Quite a few condemnation cases during the period of this survey
involved questions of procedure and damages. In Poe v. State Road
Dept.,172 it was held that the judgment in a prior condemnation action,
wherein the landowner had claimed damages to his remaining land because
of intermittent flooding, precluded any subsequent action to require con-
demnation or to recover damages based on the theory that the intermittent
flooding constituted a taking of the land. It was held that damage to
remaining land resulting from obstructing or diverting the flow of surface
waters, but which did not amount to a permanent deprivation to the owner
of the use of the remaining land, is a consequential damage and must be
recovered, if at all, in the original condemnation proceedings. In another
administrative tax deed.
168. FLA. STAT. § 193.21 (1961), providing also for assessment by the assessors when
no return is made by the taxpayer.
169. 115 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1959).
170. 60 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1952).
171. State Road Dep't v. Southland. Inc., 117 So.2d 512 (Fla. App. 1960).
172. 127 So.2d 898 (Fla. App. 1961).
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case 173 it was held, quite properly it would seem, that where the public
had acquired a prescriptive easement for highway purposes over a designated
strip of land, the fee owner thereafter was not entitled to any compensation
so far as the surface use was concerned.
In two cases174 it was held that the proper procedure for assessing
damages, when two or more persons have outstanding interests in the con-
demned land, is for the jury to assess damages only for the total value of
the land taken. After this amount is determined, it is then within the
province of the court to apportion the award among the several interest
holders. Thus, it is improper for the jury to assess separately the respective
interests of the landlord, tenant, lienor or other person. The right to
opening and closing arguments when the only question in issue is damages
was determined in Parker v. Armstrong.7 5 It was held that the condemnor
has the duty to go forward with the evidence of the value of the property
taken, and having this burden, is entitled to open and close. The court
recognized that there is a conflict of authority in the jurisdictions, 176 but
believed that it was following accepted practice in Florida.
In other cases, it was held that the landowner was not entitled to the
"work product" (which pertains to the details of arriving at a valuation) of
the condemnor;177 that a trial judge was authorized to grant a new trial when
he was shocked by the amount of the verdict which was less than the
estimate of just compensation filed by the petitioner with his declaration
of taking; 178 that the landowner is entitled to withdraw the amount deposited
by the petitioner only up to the time of judgment and not thereafter even
if he makes the withdrawal before appeal; 179 that in converting a regular
highway to a limited access facility, the condemnor must pay for the loss
of access since it is being destroyed and not regulated; 8 0 that damages are
not recoverable for change in grade or other alteration in an existing street;' 8 '
173. Tideway Corp. v. State Road Dep't, 118 So.2d 595 (Fla. App. 1960).
174. Parker v. Armstrong, 125 So.2d 138 (Fla. App. 1960); Rich v. Harper Neon
Co., 124 So.2d 750-(Fla. App. 1960). Sec also Comment, 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 102
(1961).
175. Parker v. Armstrong, supra note 174.
176. See Parker v. Armstrong, 125 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. App. 1960), citing Annot.,
73 A.L.R.2d 618 (1960), for authorities. For support of the contrary position, see
Sawyer, In Trial of Condemnation Cases, Land Owner Should Open and Close, 34 FLA.
B.J. 1061 (1960).
177. State Road Dep't v. Cline, 122 So.2d 827 (Fla. App. 1960); State Road Dep't
v. Shell, 122 So.2d 215 (Fla. App. 1960).
178. Bennett v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 131 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1961),
quashing 124 So.2d 307 (Fla. App. 1960).
179. Woodrow Co. v. Dade County, 126 So.2d 908 (Fla. App. 1961). The case
also held, however, that the county was not entitled to dismiss under FLA. STAT. § 73.14
(1959), because that statute authorizes dismissal only when the owner takes the judgment
amount after appeal, whereas in the instant case the landowner withdrew the additional
funds before appeal but after judgment.
180. Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Anhoco Corp., 116 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1959),
modifying 107 So.2d 51 (Fla. App. 1958), effectuated, 117 So.2d 15, 16 (Fla. App. 1960).
See also Anhoco Corp. v. Dade County, 127 So.2d 464 (Fla. App. 1961).
181. Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Milford, 115 So.2d 778 (Fla. App. 1959).
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that real estate taxes are a lien as of January 1 and are not pro-ratable; 182
that the statute'83: allowing damages to an adjacent business is not applicable
when the condemnation destroys the business by taking both the business
and the land; 184 that a proposed use need not be taken into consideration
in awarding damages when conversion to such use has not been sufficiently
developed;185 and in a number of cases small attorney fees were held not
so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court or to require a
reversal. 180
VI. MECHANics' LIENS AND MORTGAGES
Mechanics' Liens: An Assist to Materialmen and Sub-subcontractors
The 1961 legislature amended the Mechanics' Lien Law to provide that
a materialman furnishing materials to a subcontractor, and a subcontractor
performing services for a subcontractor, are entitled to a lienY.7  hllis
legislation changes the results reached in two decisions, 188 the most recent
occurring in 1961.
In 1954, Richard Store Co. v. Florida Bridge & Iron, Inc. 89 held that a
sub-subcontractor was entitled to no special protection from the owner
and was not entitled to a lien. It was pointed out that the owner can get
a sworn statement from the contractor, and the contractor can pay the
subcontractor, but that the contractor can hardly be responsible for the
default of the subcontractor when the contractor fully performs his obliga-
tion to the subcontractor and is not in privity with the sub-subcontractor.
Thus, denial of the lien was based on both statutory construction and the
practicalities of the situation-the difficulty of both the owner and col-
tractor in protecting against defaults of subcontractors and more remote
parties participating in the construction. The theory of the Richard case
was followed in Gory v. White,90 which denied a lien to a supplier furnish-
ing materials to a subcontractor.
182. Ibid.
183. FLA. STAT. § 73.10(4) (1961).
184. Guarria v. State Road Dep't, 117 So.2d 5 (Fla. App. 1960).
185. Coral-Glade Co. v. Board of Public Instruction, 122 So.2d 587 (Fla. App. 1960).
186. State Road Dep't v. Cox, 118 So.2d 668 (Fla. App. 1960); Breitbart v. State
Road Dep't, 116 So.2d 458 (Fla. App. 1959); Fekany v. State Road Dep't, 115 So.2d
418 (Fla. App. 1959). Conversely, a verdict for $1 damages and $2000 attorney fees was
upheld in Anhoco Corp. v. Dade County, 127 So.2d 464 (Fla. App. 1961); see also note
180 supira. The jury's assessment of damages was upheld and the trial judge's order reduc-
ing the amount was held error in Blinkman v. Dade County, 115 So.2d 23 (Fla. App.
1959).
187. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-326, creating FLA. STAT. § 84.021 (1961).
188. Richard Store Co. v. Florida Bridge & Iron, Inc., 77 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1954);
Gory v. White, 129 So.2d 446 (Fla. App. 1961). In DiCamillo v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 122 So.2d 499 (Fla. App. 1960), a sub-subcontractor was entitled to, recover in a
direct action on a contractor's bond under the rationale of a third party beneficiary contract.
189. 77 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1954).
190. 129 So.2d 446 (Fla. App. 1961).
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Both of these cases are now changed, and remote parties may perfect a
lien against the landowner. 191  In enacting the new statute, the legislature
was apparently unimpressed with the difficulties of protecting against the
defaults of subcontractors. Perhaps, however, the position of the landowner
is not substantially worse than before as long as the provisions relating to
proper payment 192 are not changed. Apparently, it is only when the owner
has notice of pending or actual liens that subsequent payments to the con-
tractor are not proper."" Nevertheless, it is believed that a second look
at the underlying philosophy of the Mechanics' Lien Law is in order. Some
responsibility as to the reliability of the parties with whom they contract
might be imposed on suppliers of materials and other contractors, instead
of putting all the risk on the landowner. l"'
Proper Payment
The ascertainment of the contract price and the amount of payments
properly made were some of the principal difficulties in Broderick v. Over-
head Door Co., 95 which applied the statutory rule'96 that the total amount
of liens cannot exceed the contract price less the amounts properly paid.
The determination of the contract price was difficult because of dispute
as to the many extras furnished and the amount to be charged for them.197
The owners had paid all of the original contract price although there was
no sworn statement' 98 furnished them as to unpaid lienors. Hence, the
court had to ascertain both the new contract price and the amount improp-
191. Note 187 supra and accompanying text.
192. Total liens cannot exceed the contract price less the amounts "properly paid."
FLA. STAT. § 84.02 (1961). See also Broderick v. Overhead Door Co., 117 So.2d 240
(Fla. App. 1959).
193. FLA. STAT. § 84.05 (1961) defines proper payment. FLA. STAT. § 84.04 (1961)
provides for the lienor filing notice of a pending lien on the owner, and also provides
(§ 84.04(3)) that the contractor shall provide the owner with a sworn statement con-
cerning the status of payments to lienors before the final payment is due. This section relat-
ing to the sworn statement applies only to lienors directly employed by or contracting
directly with the contractor. This section was not changed by the 1961 legislation. See also
notes 195-99 infra as to proper payments.
The case of Ludwig & Kibbey Enterprises, Inc. v. Cox Steel & Supply, Inc., 119 So.2d
58 (Fla. App. 1960), involved progress payments and the waiver of receipt vouchers re-
quired by the contract.
194. Materialmen generally are more cognizant of the law and in a better position
to protect themselves than the unsuspecting homeowner who often finds that he has paid
a contractor for repairs or alterations in full, and then has to pay again for all the materials
used. See Krasny, The Florida Mechanics' Lien Act; Interpretation and Analysis of
Selected Provisions, 14 U. MIANH L. REV. 73, 93-98 (1959), for policy discussion and a
suggested reform.
195. 117 So.2d 240 (Fla. App. 1959).
196. FLA. STAT. § 84.02 (1961).
197. That the written contract provides against alteration except by an instrument
in writing does not preclude evidence of an oral modification for extras and equipment
rental where there is no question but that the parties had accepted and acted on such
modification. Larnel Builders, Inc. v. Nicholas, 123 So.2d 284 (Fla. App. 1960).
198. The contractor is not entitled to a lien while in default as to the sworn
statement. Mermell v. McKinley, 126 So.2d 902 (Fla. App. 1961). See also note 193
supra. See, however, note 213 infra.
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erly paid in order to ascertain the allowable amount of liens. In disposing
of the litigation, the court also reasserted established principles relative to
liens of contractors. For example, the contractor is entitled to no lien in
excess of the contract price as it is finally calculated, and the contractor,
since he deals directly with the owner, may perfect and prosecute his lien
at any time within a year after final payment is due. 99
Lien Against Lessor: Conditional Sales
By statute200 the lessor's interest is subject to mechanics' liens when
improvements are made in accordance with a contract between the lessor
and lessee. Hence, a provision in a lease to the effect that no lien shall be
superior to the lessor's interest is contrary to the statutory policy and is
ineffective. 201  Further, as long as construction takes place on the land,
there is an improvement within the meaning of the Mechanics' Lien Law,
and it is immaterial whether or not the construction is advantageous to
the land.202
The above proposition as to the relative advantage of the "improvement"
was injected in a case involving the installation of a prefabricated diner type
of restaurant.203 The diner was sold on a conditional sales contract, title
remaining in the seller until he was fully paid. The court found that the
lienor had knowledge of the retained title contract, had acquiesced therein,
and hence held that he had no lien against the diner.20 4  The lienor was
entitled to a lien against the lessor, however, for the installation of the
cement block auxiliary building, walk-in ice box, and other "improvements."
Partial Release
The validity of a partial release of lien was apparently established by
the case of Ideal Roofing 6' Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Katzentine.20
Prior to this decision there were two cases 200 which caused some concern
in this regard, but in both cases the language of the release itself indicated
199. Broderick v. Overhead Door Co., 117 So.2d 240 (Fla. App. 1959). When the
contract is made directly with the owner, or through his agent, neither the cautionary
notice nor the record lien notice is necessary as a prerequisite to enforce the lien. Bucking-
ham Properties, Inc. v. E. R. Anderson & Co., 125 So.2d 756 (Fla. App. 1961).
200. FLA. STAT. § 84.03(2) (1961). The subjection of the lessor's interest to a
mechanics' lien has been the subject of frequent litigation. See the cases discussed in
Boyer, Ankus and Friedman, Survey of Real Property Law, 12 U. MIAMi L. REV. 499, 524(1958), and Boyer, Real Property Law, 14 U. MIAMri L. REV. 638, 677 (1960).
201. Ideal Roofing & Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Katzentine, 127 So.2d 116 (Fla.
App. 1961).
202. E. & E. Elec. Co. v. Gold Coast 72nd St. Diner, Inc., 116 So.2d 660 (Fla.
App. 1959).
203. Ibid.
204. Ibid.
205. 127 So.2d 116 (Fla. App. 1961).
206. Jowein, Inc. v. Sudy Realty Corp., 73 So.2d 227 (Fla. 1954); Westinghouse
Elec. Supply Co. v. Levin, 115 So.2d 423 (Fla. App. 1959).
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a general release, and hence the lienor was denied his lien when he later
asserted it. In Ideal Roofing207 it was pointed out that the fact that the word
"Partial" was inserted in the caption of the instrument before the words
"Release of Lien" was not controlling, and that the instruments in the
other cases were construed as general releases. It should be noted, however,
that the contents of the release were not before the court in Ideal Roofing,
the case having arisen on a motion to dismiss. The case does suggest, how-
ever, that if the body of the instrument clearly indicates an intent to release
a lien only for work done or materials furnished up to the time of release,
it will be given effect accordingly and not as a general release.
Miscellaneous
Other cases involving mechanics' liens held: when an agent of the owner
contracts for the work, there is direct privity between the lienor and owner
so that it is not necessary to file either a cautionary or a record lien notice
in order to enforce a lien; 20° that an agent who contracts in his own name
nevertheless obligates the owner and subjects his realty to a lien, because
an undisclosed principal may be held liable for the acts of his agent;209
that an equitable interest, when the legal title is held in trust, may be
subject to a mechanics' lien since the word "owner" includes an owner in
equity as well as in law; 210 that an owner is not entitled to bond premium
costs involved in transferring the lien to security even if the owner is ulti-
mately successful;21' that an assignee of a lien may maintain the suit although
the claim of lien was filed by the assignor;212 and that although a contractor
does not supply a sworn statement, if he proves that subcontractors, material-
men and laborers have in fact been paid, he may have a lien against the
owner.
213
Mortgages: Future Advances
An important case 214 of first impression, involving the validity of a
mortgage executed to secure future advances over a homestead status sub-
sequently attaching, has already been discussed. 215 Similarly, the amendment
to the statute210 concerning future advances has also been noted.217
207. 127 So.2d 116 (Fla. App. 1961).
208. Buckingham Properties, Inc. v. E. R. Anderson & Co., 125 So.2d 756 (Fla.
App. 1961). See also note 199 supra.
209. Armstrong v. Blackadar, 118 So.2d 854 (Fla. App. 1960).
210. Amatrudi v. Blake, 117 So.2d 416 (Fla. App. 1960).
211. In re Carol Florida Corp., 118 So.2d 837 (Fla. App. 1960).
212. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Carol Florida Corp., 122 So.2d 795 (Fla. App.
1960).
213. Belcher v. Russell, 128 So.2d 623 (Fla. App. 1961). See also note 19-
supra as to the sworn statement.
214. Simpson v. Simpson, 123 So.2d 289 (Fla. App. 1960).
215. See "The Tale of How Mother and Son Outwitted the Bride," in text accom-
panying note 91 supra.
216. FLA. STAT. § 697.04 (1961).
217. Note 94 supra.
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Priorities, or Who's on First
The case of National Title Ins. Co. v. Mercury Builders, Inc.2 1t involved
the priority of a purchase money mortgage, mechanics' liens, and a construc-
tion mortgage, with the order of precedence being determined in the
sequence stated. In this case the fee owner conveyed to a purchaser and
took back a purchase money mortgage. The deed and mortgage were
recorded a week later, with the construction mortgage following three days
thereafter. Apparently visible construction work began prior to the recorda-
tion of any of these instruments, thus giving rise to the claim of priority
by the mechanics' lienors.2 1 9
Although there was reference to a subordination agreement in the
option to purchase and the purchase money mortgage, it was concluded that
there was insufficient evidence to establish that the vendor had in fact
subordinated his purchase money mortgage to the construction mortgage.
Hence, the purchase money mortgage obtained priority over the later
construction mortgage.
The purchase money mortgage was also held superior to the mechanics'
liens. This was based on the general principle that a purchase money
mortgage, executed simultaneously with the conveyance, takes precedence
over liens arising through the mortgagor, although the latter be prior in
point of time. As applied to mechanics' liens, this doctrine was limited to
those instances where the lien was acquired at the instance of the purchaser
prior to the execution of the mortgage and without the acquiescence of the
vendor. It was also found that the lienors could not have been misled by
the delay in recording the deed and purchase money mortgage since until
then the recorded fee title was in the vendor-mortgagee. -2 2 0
Other priority cases involved the principle that possession inconsistent
with record title constitutes inquiry notice,2 2 I and that forbearance for a
definite period from proceeding to collect a note for a pre-existing indebt-
edness is sufficient consideration for the execution of a mortgage to entitle
the lender to the protection of the recording act.2 22
Junior Lienor: Rights When Omitted From Foreclosure
The rights of a junior incumbraneer who is omitted in foreclosure
218. 124 So.2d 132 (Fla. App. 1960).
219. Mechanics' liens when perfected take effect as of the visible commencement
of operations except where there has been an interruption and subsequent resumption of
construction. FLA. STAT. § 84.03 (1961).
220. National Title Ins. Corp. v. Mercury Builders, Inc., 124 So.2d 132 (Fla.
App. 1960).
221. Lee County Bank v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 126 So.2d 589 (Fla. App.
1961). See "The Case of the Bank Which Looked and Waited," in text accompanying
note 57 supra.
222. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 113 So.2d 869 (Fla.
App. 1959).
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proceedings were briefly delineated, but not too clearly, in the factually
interesting case of Marks Bros. Paving Co. v. Ouellet.22 3 ME, the holder
of a second and third mortgage, foreclosed without joining L, a mechanics'
lienor whose lien was inferior to the second mortgage, but superior to the
third. ME purchased at the foreclosure, but he did not go into occupancy.
Thereafter L, the omitted lienor, filed a foreclosure, obtained a cer-
tificate of title and took possession. In this foreclosure L joined the record
owner, but not ME as the holder of the third mortgage which was inferior
to L's lien.
Since the omission of a junior lienor in a foreclosure suit leaves that
party in the same position as though no foreclosure had occurred, 224 L's lien
was not affected by ME's foreclosure, and L was properly exercising one
of his remedics in bringing the foreclosure suit. The effect of L's fore-
closure was said to have divested ME of his title acquired through fore-
closure, but not of his third mortgage lien, since ME was not joined as
holder of an inferior lien. Inherent in the decision is the proposition that
there was no merger of ME's third mortgage with his second mortgage and
title procured from the foreclosure.2 25
The opinion, however, went on to say that upon a full disclosure of the
interests of all the parties, ME, as the original holder of the superior lien
that had been foreclosed, should be entitled to prevail as between the two
foreclosure sale purchasers. The court also held that L was under no duty
to account for the rents and profits realized during his possession, since he
took possession as a title holder and not as a mortgagee (or lience) in pos-
session.2 2"0  The case was remanded to allow or enforce redemption by junior
incumbrancers not joined in the foreclosures. 27
The Case of the Amorous Mortgagee
The interesting defense of merger resulting from the common law
unity of husband and wife was rejected in the case of Pinkas v. Fiveash.228
Subsequent to the execution of the mortgage, the mortgagor married the
mortgagee. Afterwards the parties were divorced, the land was conveyed,
and the mortgagee brought foreclosure proceedings.
In denying that the marriage of the mortgagor and mortgagee resulted
223. 124 So.2d 514 (Fla. App. 1960).
224. Ibid; BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §§ 32.20[3], (8) (1959).
225. On the doctrine of merger generally in mortgage transactions, see BOYER.
FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 32.1914] (1959).
226. See generally 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 454 (1952), for the concept and
attendant obligations of a mortgagee in possession. A mortgagee in possession in Florida
is not entitled to compensation for management of the estate in the absence of a special
agreement for this charge. Brooks v. Adams, 115 So.2d 578 (Fla. App. 1959).
227. Marks Bros. Paving Co. v. Ouellet, 124 So.2d 514 (Fla. App. 1960).
228. 126 So.2d 910 (Fla. App. 1961).
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in such a unity of the parties as to extinguish the mortgage, the court noted
Florida constitutional 220 and statutory230 provisions giving the wife a right
to her separate property. These provisions were held to prevail over the
common law theory that the husband and wife were one insofar as property
is concerned. Thus, the mortgage was not satisfied by merger.3 1
Acceleration, Default and Miscellaneous
Acceleration may be refused when there are substantial equities which
make it unconscionable. 23 2  Thus, in Leiberbaum v. Surfcomber Hotel
Corp.23 3 it was held that when the mortgagee could have secured payment
by simple demand, and his conduct was such as to take advantage of an
oversight in an effort to gain possession of the mortgaged premises, accelera-
tion was refused. Likewise, waiver or estoppel may preclude the mortgagee
from accelerating,2- 4 and general equitable principles may be invoked to
relieve a mortgagor from acceleration of the entire debt.23 5
In Kling v. Gladstone, 36 the mortgage provided for annual payments
of interest, but the principal was to be paid only out of half of the net
proceeds from a citrus grove. It was held that the mortgagee was entitled
to accelerate the mortgage on failure of the mortgagor to pay interest, but
since there was no binding obligation to pay principal, or a showing of net
proceeds, a decree was affirmed ordering the mortgagors to pay the defaulted
interest within a stated period, or otherwise the entire sum should become
due and the whole mortgage foreclosed.
Cases involving usury held that it is an affirmative defense and not a
counterclaim, 237 and that the pleading must state facts with such particu-
larity as the circumstances permit, and that the intent to extract an unlawful
rate of interest is an essential element.2 3R A transaction is not made usurious
by the fact that the broker or intermediary charges the borrower a heavy
commission when the intermediary has no connection with the lender. 239
When the broker is the agent of the lender, however, then his commission,
or portions of it returned to the lender (although under the guise of inspec-
tion fees), is added to the interest charge to determine usury.240  A delay
in the disbursement of funds by the lender is not necessarily determinative
229. FLA. CONS'r. art. XI, . 1.
230. I.e., FLA. SrAT. §§ 708.02, .08, .09 (1959).
231. Pinkas v. Fiveash, 126 So.2d 910 (Fla. App. 1961).
232. Leiberbaum v. Surfcomber Hotel Corp., 122 So.2d 28 (Fla. App. 1960).
233. Ibid.
234. Harrell v. Lombard, 122 So.2d 625 (Fla. App. 1960), the waiver or estoppel
(not clearly differentiated), being based on correspondence and negotiations.
235. Groner-Youngerman, Inc. v. Denison, 117 So.2d 210 (Fla. App. 1959).
236. 125 So.2d 912 (Fla. App. 1961).
237. American Nat'l Growers Corp. v. Harris, 120 So.2d 212 (Fla. App. 1960).
238. Ibid.
239. Cutri Enterprises, Inc. v. Pan Am. Bank, 115 So.2d 592 (Fla. App. 1959).
240. Williamson v. Clark, 120 So.2d 637 (Fla. App. 1960).
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of usury,24' but this delay when coupled with other factors may be influen-
tial in a finding of usury.242 When interest is intentionally exacted in excess
of twenty-five per cent, both interest and principal are forfeited.243
The party complaining of a deficiency decree on appeal has the burden
of showing a clear abuse of discretion,2 44 and that the land was sold at a
substantial profit eight months later does not of itself show inadequacy
of price.245  The proper method of service of process in a mortgage fore-
closure, when one of the mortgagors was custodian of the other mortgagor
who was incompetent, was delineated in Brown v. Mitchell.24" The statute
governing service of process 2 4ea was strictly construed and the court held
service was not proper if summonses were not served severally on the in-
competent and his custodian. In 1959 statute2 47 relating to balloon
mortgages was amended in 1961, to prescribe further the legend to be
printed or stamped on the face of the mortgage. 248
VII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
The Writing Requirement: Parol Modifications
A Florida statute requires a lease to be in writing or else a statutory
tenancy at will results.2 49  Similarly, a holding over without a written
agreement results in a tenancy at sufferance only.23 0  These statutes, how-
ever, do not prevent the intervention of equitable or other principles to
justify relief in particular cases. Thus, in S. Lemel, Inc. v. 27th Ave. Farmers
Mkt. Inc.,2 51 it was held that equity would enforce specifically an oral
agreement for a new lease on the grounds of part performance. It was
stated that holding over under an oral agreement for a new lease or renewal,
when there is possession by the tenant plus the payment and acceptance of
rent, and the terms of the agreed upon lease are definite, constitutes suf-
ficient grounds for equity to specifically enforce the agreement. Improve-
ments by the lessee under these circumstances are not necessary, although
these improvements add to his balance of the equities. 2 2
241. Shaffran v. Holness, 93 So.2d 94 (Fla. 1957), remanded and second appeal
reported in 102 So.2d 35 (Fla. App. 1958).
242. Williamson v. Clark, 120 So.2d 637 (Fla. App. 1960).
243. Ibid.
244. Tendler v. Gottlieb, 126 So.2d 308 (Fla. App. 1961).
245. Ibid.
246. 119 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1960). See also the earlier report, 114 So.2d 178 (Fla.App. 1959), and the later one permitting an amended return, 128 So.2d 8 (Fla. App.
1961).
246a. FLA. STAT. § 47.25 (1961).
247. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-356.
248. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-472.
249. FLA. STAT. § 83.01 (1961).
250. FLA. STAT. § 83.04 (1961).
251. 126 So.2d 167 (Fla. App. 1961).
252. Ibid.
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Similarly, specific performance of an option to renew may be granted
although the original lease is not signed, when there is adequate proof that
the parties agreed on all the essential terms.2 53  Specific performance was
granted in this case although the action was brought by the lessee indi-
vidually, whereas the lease had been taken in the name of one of her
corporate entities. The court stated that when the parties had been uncon-
cerned about the corporate identity of the lessee, this factor was immaterial.
Doctrines of waiver or estoppel may preclude a party from objecting to
parol evidence as varying the terms of a written lease. Thus, in an action
for rent, 254 the tenants were estopped, although the lease had been defec-
tively executed, when the tenants took possession of an apartment and then
on request moved to another apartment on the same terms and conditions.
Similarly, if a party makes no objection.in the trial court as to the parol
evidence, he cannot complain in an appellate court.255
Conditions of the Premises: Contractual Provisions
In order to recover for breach of a lease covenant, the complaining party
must prove damages. Thus, when the plaintiffs relied on elimination of
a door as breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, but could show no
losses or damages sustained, a summary judgment for the landlord was
affirmed.2 56  The same case reached the same result of no recovery, for
breach of a covenant granting the exclusive right to sell beer in a shopping
center, because there was no showing of losses or damages. 257
In Zero Food Storage, Inc. v. Henderson's Sea Food, Inc.,25s the lease
provided that the tenant should keep the interior, and that the lessor should
keep the exterior, in good repair. It was held that the duty as to the septic
tank, which was located outside, but connected with plumbing inside, fell
on the lessor. When the lessor had made certain oral warranties as to
the structural strength of the building, knowing them to be false, and the
tenant was not likely to discover this weakness from a visual inspection,
the lease was cancelled when the building was inadequate for the lessee's
contemplated use.259
A holding over, except as to the duration of the term, is normally subject
to all the terms and conditions of the original lease. This principle was
253. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Crossman, 286 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1961), earlier
report, 273 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1959).
254. Lipkin v. Bonita Garden Apartments, Inc., 122 So.2d 623 (Fla. App. 1960),
cert. denied, 125 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1960).
255. Frank v. Pioneer Metals, Inc., 121 So.2d 685 (Fla. App. 1960), cert. denied,
123 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1960).
256. Duchaine v. Grosco Realty, Inc., 121 So.2d 679 (Fla. App. 1960).
257. Ibid.
258. 121 So.2d 462 (Fla. App. 1960), appeal dismissed, 125 So.2d 875 (Fla. 1960).
259. Frank v. Pioneer Metals, Inc., 121 So.2d 685 (Fla. App. 1960), cert. denied.
123 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1960).
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applied in Wingert v. Prince,2 60 in which there was a lengthy holdover and
the tenant originally had the right to remove improvements erected by him.
The land was condemned, and it was held that the tenant, in accordance
with the terms of the original lease, was entitled to the value of the
improvements.
Termination
For a leasehold to be terminated by merger, the fee and leasehold must
be united in the same person, at the same time, and in the same right. Thus,
when a trustee acquires both interests, but for different beneficiaries, there
is no termination by merger.261
Liquidated Damages; Acceleration
In Platt v. Mannheinter,262 the majority of the court, following asser-
tions in the first report of Kanter v. Safran,2 63 apparently 26 4 allowed the
landlord to recover past due rents, taxes and insurance, because of their
ascertainable characteristics, in addition to the liquidated damages specified
in the lease. The dissenting opinion 2 65 thought that the Kanter case was
not controlling as to rents and taxes since a penalty was involved in that
case, whereas both parties agreed that in the instant case the clause under
dispute was a valid liquidated damage provision. It is interesting to note
that the liquidated damages in question consisted of an improvement erected
by the lessee and that no additional security or deposit was involved.
Willscott, Inc. v. Ullman266 construed the acceleration clause in issue
as accelerating only the next month's rent and not the entire balance to
become due during the remainder of the term.
Remedies of the Landlord
In a distress proceeding, when the amount demanded is in good faith
and within the court's jurisdiction, the court does not lose jurisdiction if
it determines that a lesser amount is owing than its minimum jurisdictional
requirement. 267  The court under these circumstances is authorized to
render judgment for the amount due.
260. 123 So.2d 277 (Fla. App. 1960).
261. Whiteside v. Sherman, 122 So.2d 799 (Fla. App. 1960).
262. 124 So.2d 503 (Fla. App. 1960).
263. 68 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1953); subsequent decisions arc found in 82 So.2d 508
(Fla. 1955); 99 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1958).
264. The maiority simply affirmed the case on the basis of Kanter v. Safran, 68 So.2d
553 (Fla. 1953). It is only from the dissenting opinion that one gets an inference of the
issues and basis of decision.
265. Platt v. Mannheimer, 124 So.2d 503, 504 (Fla. App. 1960).
266. 117 So.2d 856 (Fla. App. 1960).
267. Frank v. Pioneer Metals, Inc., 121 So.2d 685 (Fla. App. 1960), cert. denied,
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Summary Eviction; Legislation
The two Florida statutes 208 relating to summary eviction proceedings
were amended to provide that the attorney for the landlord may execute
a petition for the removal of a delinquent tenant.26 9 This statute is not
likely to affect the quite technical, and probably nonsensical, result of
Kagan v. Blue Ocean Villas, Inc.,270 because the legislation applies only to
the filing of the petition and not to the prosecution of an appeal. In the
Kagan case the appeal was dismissed because the party appealing did not
make the good faith oath required by the statute, but instead, the affidavit
was executed by his attorney. The result can be justified, of course, on the
doctrine of strict construction, but how strict should one be?2 71
Another rather technical construction of the statutes applicable to
appeals is found in Youngberg v. Chatlos.27 2 In this case it was determined
that the time for appeal, when the suit is in the county court, runs from
the entry of final judgment and is not stayed or tolled by a motion for
new trial or motion to vacate. The time limit for appeal from this court
is ten days,273 but it is only two days from the county judge's court.274 How-
ever, by statute, the time limit for appeal from the county judge's court
may run from the denial of a motion for a new trial. 275 The Youngberg
case also held that appeal is the only method of obtaining review of an
eviction proceeding from the county court; certiorari is not available.276
123 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1960); Willscott, Inc. v. Ullman, 117 So.2d 856 (Fla. App. 1960).
268. FLA. MTAT. §§ 83.21, .28 (1961).
269. Fla. Laws .1961, ch. 61-318.
270. 118 So.2d 64 (Fla. App. 1960), appeal dismissed, 122 So.2d 405 (Fla. 1960).
271. See the argument of the dissenting judge in Kagan v. Blue Ocean Villas, Inc.,
118 So.2d 64, 66 (Fla. App. 1960), contending that the decision is an unreasonable
abridgement of the constitutional right to appeal as provided in FLA. CONST. art. V,§ 5(3).
272. 117 So.2d 861 (Fla. App. 1960).
273. FLA. STAT. § 83.38 (1961). This statute actually refers to review by writ of
error, whereas the statute concerning review of the proceedings from the county judge's
court refers to it as an appeal. See FLA. STAr. § 83.27 (1961).
274. FLA. STAT. § 83.27 (1961).
275. Ibid.
276. Youngberg v. Chatlos, 117 So.2d 861 (Fla. App. 1960).
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